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How Quantum Mechanics Changed Ontology
For most scientific theories, there is a “standard” way to understand
what they are about (their “ontology”). By contrast, standard QM
textbooks leave central ontological questions unanswered (e.g.
about the referent of |ψ〉 outside measurement contexts).
A dilemma for quantum ontology
Relying on non-standard approaches to QM involves
speculation, i.e. commitments that are underdetermined by
the empirical evidence:
mutually conflicting solutions to the measurement problem
(Everett, Bohm, GRW),
quantum state monism vs. various kinds of primitive ontology.
Retreating to the standard (“Copenhagen”) approach seems
ontologically unsatisfactory.
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The First Horn: Embracing Speculation
Non-committal version:
Ontology as spelling out how the world could be, not as issuing
claims about how the world is (example: Allori et al. 2014).
Not interesting if one seeks to avoid (rather than celebrate)
ontological speculation.
Ambitious version:
Commitment to one specific ontology, denying that it is
speculative or underdetermined, because its (alleged)
alternatives are somehow deficient.
However, there is no consensus as to which ontology
deserves that status (cf. Callender 2020 on the controversy
between Wallace and Bricmont).
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The Second Horn: Non-Representationalism
Various authors have claimed that we can avoid the speculations of
the first horn without embracing the antirealism of the second horn:
Bub (2016) emphasizes the difference between his
information-theoretic approach to QM and an instrumentalist
view ot theories.
Fuchs (2017) insists that his QBism is neither instrumentalism
nor any other kind of antirealism, but should instead be viewed
as “participatory realism”.
Healey (2020) advocates a “pragmatist quantum realism”.
However, all these approaches take the quantum formalism to
serve some other purpose than to represent elements of reality.
Their realism (if it is a realism) does therefore not take QM to be
ontologically informative.
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Middle Ground? Partial Representationalism
Ladyman and Ross (2007; 2013) take QM to be ontologically
significant, but deny that this commits us to any of the
“realistic” solutions of the measurement problem. Instead, they
seek to dissolve the problem (drawing on ideas from Bohr),
which leads to a conflict with even a minimal realism (cf. Egg
2019).
Saatsi (2019, 2020) takes the quantum formalism to somehow
represent reality, but refuses to spell out this representing role
in ontological terms. His “progress realism” therefore abstains
from any ontological commitment (cf. Section 3 below).
Cordero (2001) gives some concrete examples of what might
constitute a non-speculative quantum ontology, but Callender
(2020) disputes their pertinence (cf. Section 4 below).
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Ontology from QM Textbooks?
The basic idea
Ontology should be informed by our best scientific theories.
QM is one of our best (empirically most successful) theories.
Its success does not depend on any of its (ontologically
kosher) non-standard formulations, but on the (rather messy)
apparatus of “textbook quantum mechanics” (TQM).
Hence, TQM should be taken ontologically seriously.
TQM is obviously not a clearly circumscribed theory. Nevertheless,
its core is easy to identify, consisting of uncontroversial examples
of scientific achievements that any version of QM must be able to
reproduce.
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Ontology of QM as Non-Fundamental
But how can TQM inform our ontology when it leaves fundamental
ontological questions unanswered?
True, in order to inform fundamental ontology, TQM would
have to address the measurement problem (and surrounding
ontological issues), which it does not.
But not all ontology is fundamental ontology. If it were, we
should not expect ontological lessons from any version of QM,
because QM is inherently non-fundamental. (If QM is
sometimes classified as part of “fundamental physics”, this
can only mean that QM is fundamental relative to other parts
of physics.)
Compare: Even QFT (which is certainly more fundamental
than QM) is nowadays treated as an effective (i.e.
non-fundamental) theory, but this should not stop it from
informing our ontology (see Williams 2019).
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More on Non-Fundamental Ontology
Essential feature of effective theories: irrelevance of the way in
which they emerge from underlying theories.
In this sense, effective theories do not describe the nature of
their posits. How then can they inform ontology?
Instead of telling us what the posits are (fundamentally), they
tell us what they do (effectively). This yields a functional
ontology (examples in Sections 3 and 4).
Doesn’t this approach yield unwanted ontological commitments,
e.g. to phlogiston or gravitational forces?
1 Phlogiston is not a posit of an effective theory, because there
is no well-defined energy range successfully described by
phlogiston theory.
2 (controversial!) Newtonian gravity arguably is an effective
theory, therefore we should accept the reality of gravitational
forces just as we accept other non-fundamental entities (cf.
Wilson 2007).
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The Case of Spin
The quantum notion of spin is a hard case for anyone seeking to
find ontological content in TQM:
On the one hand, spin is crucially involved in the success of
QM, hence it should be a core part of quantum ontology:
In relation to key realist criteria, spin surely ticks all the boxes, by virtue
of being deeply explanatory, unifying, and even effectively
manipulable. Hence, we should be realists about spin, as much as we
are realists about any theoretical notion. (Saatsi 2020, 41)
On the other hand, the ontological content of theoretical
claims about spin seems unavoidably speculative:
The challenge to truth-content realism is that it seems forced to buy
into ‘deeply’ metaphysical assumptions — assumptions that are
epistemologically unwarranted by the realist lights — in trying to spell
out what we claim to know about, e.g., silver atoms in a Stern-Gerlach
machine. (ibid, 47–48)
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Ontology of the Stern-Gerlach Experiment
Reminder: Ontological commitment to spin need not involve any
fundamental claim on what spin is, but only functional knowledge
of what spin does.
Saatsi challenges even this knowledge (using the simple example
of a Stern-Gerlach experiment):
While TQM views spin as a property of electrons which results
in atoms being deflected in a magnetic field, spin is not a
property of electrons at all according to other versions of QM.
Even if spin is acknowledged as a real property, its behaviour
(function) differs radically depending on whether it is described
by a collapse or a no-collapse version of QM.
(In the following, I will only respond to the first challenge. See the
written version for a response to the second.)
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The Universally Acknowledged Reality of Spin
For concreteness, consider the theory that departs most radically
from TQM’s “spin as a property of quantum particles” picture:
According to Super-Humean Bohmian Mechanics (Esfeld and
Deckert 2018), particles’ only properties are their positions, spin is
nothing but a parameter for describing their motion.
However, the fact that spin is not part of fundamental ontology
does not mean that it lacks reality. (Bohmian treatments of
spin do not seek to replace but to recover the TQM account.)
Indeed, when Wilson (2018) accuses Esfeld and Deckert of
instrumentalism, they explicitly acknowledge the reality of spin
and other non-fundamental properties.
Of course, Bohmian Mechanics is compatible with
instrumentalism about spin, but the same instrumentalism
would then follow for all non-fundamental properties, so there
would be nothing special about QM.
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Two-Path Interference Experiments
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Figure 4.3 Two-Path Setup
by Barrett (2000), the main issue was that Englert et al. assumed that they knew, from
quantum theory, that the ‘real’ trajectories didn’t bounce.
4.5.6 Bohr orbits
Perhaps I’m missing Cordero’s point. Cordero suggests that there are layers of models
that exist in quantum physics. The idea might be that many of these models are shared
in common amongst quantum programs. Although not purely quantum, there is,
for example, the Bohr model of the atom, and the BCS model of superconductors.
There are also whole theories and interpretations of this ‘middle layer,’ such as
semiclassical mechanics and the semiclassical interpretation. Again I find myself
drawn to Cordero’s position. His picture of physics as complex sets of models covering
different regimes is much more realistic than that of many philosophers. One wouldn’t
be surprised if Everett, Collapse and Bohm, ever the enemies, end up holding hands
in peace at the semiclassical level. Alas, I don’t think that is so either. Let’s agree
to relax what we mean by quantum. Now we just want significant claims about the
unobservable that aren’t purely in the classical domain. That might not be enough to
justify a realism about the quantum, but it would be a start.
Start with Bohr orbits. Consider hydrogen again and now its orbits. In the Bohm
theory, when the electron is not at rest it orbits the z-axis with constant speed and
radius and is independent of mass. In the Bohr model, by contrast, the electron traces
out orbits in the equatorial plane and the radius is a function of mass. The orbits are
around different axes and one is a function of mass yet the other isn’t. (See Fortin,
Lombardi, and González, 2017 for this case and more.) They’re different and it’s hard
to see how one approximates the other in any way. Again, at the measurement level,
the Bohmian will be able to explain why the Bohr model worked as well as it did; but
the reason isn’t that Bohm particles travel the same orbits.
4.5.7 Semiclassical particle in a box
A field known as semiclassical physics (associated with the physicist Gutzwiller)
develops and examines connections between classical orbits and quantum fluctua-
tions. In this area, a system is understood to be ‘semiclassical’ if the classical action
Again, there seems to be a
radical discrepancy between
TQM and an ontologically serious
theory such as Bohmian
mechanics: From the viewpoint
of TQM, Bohmian trajectories
seem “surrealistic”, because they
bounce at point I (Callender
2020).
Bohmians respond to the charge of surrealism by pointing out
that they do not actually contradict TQM, but only some
pretheoretical assumptions about what is measured in a
position measurement (Barrett 2000).
This response turns on TQM’s vagueness about trajectories,
so it do s not yet give us any positive content for a
non-speculative ontology.
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Do Wave Packets Occupy Space?
Proposal: Our ontological commitment should be to wave packets,
because they play an essential role in any account of two-path
interference.
Objection: Wave packets are not local beables, so they are not
“there” in the same sense as Bohmian particles (and other
instances of primitive ontology) are “there”.
Reply: “being there” cannot be separated from the dynamics!
The most serious danger [of the primitive ontology approach] . . . , is
the danger of sliding into thinking that there is a two-step process.
First, one posits an ontology, with no dynamical assumptions, that is,
no assumptions about how it behaves, and then one posits a dynamics
for it. . . . The problem with this is that, until we have said something
about how the purported ontology acts, we haven’t yet given sense to
the claim that it is there at all. What it is for an object to occupy a
region of space, or, indeed, to have any sort of spatial relations to
anything, is for it to do something there—exclude other objects, or
reflect light, or something of the sort. (Myrvold 2018, 104–105)
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Why Wave Packets Are (Really) ”There”
The inadequacy of separating ontology from dynamics
becomes particularly salient in cases where a Bohmian
particle triggers a detector located on the path it has not taken.
Granted, the theory has a coherent story to tell about the
particle’s location and its non-local effect on the detector, but
this is a technical sense of “location” and not the ordinary
sense of “being there” from which the objection to wave
packets derives its force.
What is “there” in the ordinary sense (of “doing something
there”) is an empty wave packet, which is just what TQM
postulates as well.
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Conclusion
Existing approaches to quantum ontology are either too
speculative or they lack an interesting ontological commitment.
Taking TQM ontologically seriously is a way out of this
dilemma. (Of course, its ontological substance needs to be
further developed beyond the two examples discussed here.)
The resulting ontology is inherently non-fundamental, but this
is the best we can do anyway (given the present state of
physics).
The insight that an ontology informed by our best current
science cannot be fundamental is one of the ways in which
QM has changed philosophy.
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